Chapter C1 Perception of Legal Language by Durant, Alan & Leung, Janny H.C.
Language and Law
 
A resource book for students 
Allan Durant 
and Janny H.C. Leung 
First published 2016 
ISBN: 978-1-138-02558-5 (hbk) 
ISBN: 978-1-138-02557-8 (pbk) 
ISBN: 978-1-315-43625-8 (ebk) 
Chapter C1 







108 E X P L O R A T I O N :  A N A L Y S E S  A N D  E X A M P L E S  
PERCEPTION OF LEGAL LANGUAGE 
From a linguist’s descriptive point of view, all language varieties are equal; value 
judgements are irrelevant. In wider society, however, some varieties are commonly 
associated with strong expressions of attitude, either of liking or dislike. This 
phenomenon is perhaps most focused linguistically on accents, especially contrasts 
between urban and rural accents (since either may be perceived as harsh, mellifluous, 
grating, etc.). Such attitudes may also be directed towards whole dialects and gen ­
erational language styles. The rush to linguistic judgement or prejudice merges into 
wider social attitudes directed towards other semiotic phenomena, including clothing 
styles, behaviour and cultural tastes. Attitudes towards language variation can also 
contribute to the relative social prestige of a variety, even if perceptions underpinning 
the attitude in question are based on stereotypes of speakers, places or professions rather 
than linguistic facts. 
Expressions of feeling are especially animated in relation to the variety we have 
described as legal language. Around this variety – for all its internal variation and 
substantial change over time – circulates a great deal of criticism, scorn and 
campaigning for reform. There is also a substantial literature of parody and wider satire. 
In this unit, we examine such critical representations of legal language. What features, 
we ask, have become so conventionalised that, even used selectively and transferred 
to other subject matter, they still give rise to particular respect, dissatisfaction or 
amusement? Discussion of these aspects of legal language will connect our description 
of the variety’s characteristics, history and functions to a wider social context of beliefs, 
attitudes and continuing controversies. 
Attitudes and perceptions 
Attitudes towards different accents have been studied in fields cutting across linguistics 
and psychology (Giles 1970; Giles and Coupland 1991). Few scholarly studies have been 
published of attitudes towards professional varieties in particular, however. Criticism 
of legal language is nevertheless common not only among laypeople, but even among 
legal scholars and legal professionals, who in some cases are also authors of parodies 
and satire of the language they themselves use professionally. 
As regards English in particular, here is Tiersma: 
One of the great paradoxes about the legal profession is that lawyers are, on the one hand, 
among the most eloquent users of the English language while, on the other, they are 
perhaps its most notorious abusers. Why is it that lawyers, who may excel in com ­
municating with a jury, seem incapable of writing an ordinary, comprehensible English 
sentence in a contract, deed, or will? 
(Tiersma 1999) 
Note Tiersma’s strong polemical terms, including ‘notorious abusers’ and ‘incapable’. 
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❏	 Sometimes it is difficult to decide whether, in a given context, the widely 
used phrase ‘talking like a lawyer’ is a compliment or an insult. Keeping 
Tiersma’s comments above in mind, can you see reasons why these two 
apparently opposite perceptions should be so closely connected with one 
another? 
Linguistic perception and social comment 
As with accent perception, linguistic value judgements often get confused with social 
judgements in which references made to language are merely symptomatic: the opinion 
is about professional practice, rather than about the language used by that profession. 
Among the most widely quoted polemical descriptions of legal language are the following: 
Swift, Gulliver’s Travels 
Here is Jonathan Swift (1667–1745), satirising lawyers in his reversal of social roles 
between humans (presented as ‘Yahoos’) and horses (‘Houyhnhnms’) in the fourth 
part of Gulliver’s Travels (1726): 
There was a Society of Men among us, bred up from the Youth in the Art of proving by 
Words multiplied for the purpose, that White is Black and Black is White, according as 
they are paid. To this Society all the rest of the People are Slaves. 
This society of men (the legal profession): 
hath a peculiar Cant and Jargon of their own, that no other Mortal can Understand, and 
wherein all their Laws are written. 
Bentham, Works 
Writing in an idiom that combines analysis and satire, here is the philosopher Jeremy 
Bentham (1748–1832) assessing lawyers’ claims regarding the degree of precision they 
achieve through their use of language: 
For this redundancy – for the accumulation of excrementitious matter in all its various 
shapes . . . for all the pestilential effects that cannot but be produced by this so enormous 
a load of literary garbage, – the plea commonly pleaded [is] . . . that it is necessary to 
precision – or, to use the word which on similar occasions they [lawyers] themselves are 
in the habit of using, certainty. 
(Bentham, Works, Bowring edition, 1843: 260; for discussion, 
see Mellinkoff 1963: 261–6) 
Dickens, Bleak House 
Here, in his celebrated indictment of the ineffectiveness of mid-nineteenth-century 
English law as embodied in the Court of Chancery, is a description of members of the 
High Court by Charles Dickens (1812–1870) as: 
Activity ✪ 
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tripping one another up on slippery precedents, groping knee-deep in technicalities, 
running their goat-hair and horse-hair warded heads against walls of words. 
(Bleak House, 1852–1853: Chapter 1) 
❏ In these brief quotations (inevitably presented here out of context), what 
aspects of legal language seem most to incite the author’s dislike? How closely 
interwoven are those features with supposed non-linguistic characteristics of 
the legal profession? 
Equally polemical literary comment against alleged excesses of legal language can 
be found throughout dictionaries of quotations (including specialised dictionaries of 
legal quotations), as well as in anthologies such as Brian Harris’s The Literature of the 
Law (1998) or Daniel White’s Trials and Tribulations: An Appealing Anthology of Legal 
Humour (1989). 
Judicial comment 
As suggested above, lawyers themselves make (and choose to publish) withering criti ­
cisms of inappropriate or excessive drafting of documents, incomprehensible legislation, 
and over-oratorical courtroom speeches. 
Here are two widely quoted examples: 
❏	 In a speech in Washington, DC (11 May 1929), the eminent and influential US judge 
Learned Hand suggested that ‘There is something monstrous in commands couched 
in invented and unfamiliar language; an alien master is the worst of all. The 
language of the law must not be foreign to the ears of those who are to obey it.’ 
❏	 In a case concerned with terms of a lease, leading UK judge Mr Justice Hoffmann 
(now Lord Hoffmann) found the flood of words in the lease so ‘torrential’ that he 
felt there might be some justification in a submission that he should set aside the 
normal principle of legal interpretation that requires account be taken of every word. 
❏ How important is it, in reading such criticisms of legal language (whether 
by legal professionals or others), to distinguish not only the targets of satire 
or polemic, but also the aims? For example, is it possible to tell whether 
criticisms are motivated by linguistic conservatism (e.g. as a critique of 
falling standards in legal drafting) or by appetite for reform? 
Parody and stereotype 
One (potentially risky) way into exploring a controversial linguistic variety is to 
examine exaggerated versions of it found in caricature. Often such representations 
accentuate characteristics used by writers as a kind of shorthand, because those 
characteristics are assumed to be perceptually salient among likely readers. Such 
char acteristics can be tested against naturally occurring data; comparing such 
Activity✪ 
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stereotypes with actual data often suggests that the conventional perceptions are highly 
inaccurate. 
The two types of data are not incompatible if used as starting points in analysis.
Taking account of caricature may even help clarify the relationship between features
of a variety that are believed sufficient to prompt a predictable response from readers 
or listeners and other features that are scarcely noticed or not noticed at all. In the
following extract, we consider the power and effects of caricature and myths about
language by considering two well-known parodies of legal discourse. 
‘I give you my orange’ 
Our first parody is a celebrated humorous imitation of legal language written in 1835 
by Arthur Symonds, in a book called The Mechanics of Law-Making. Symonds’
caricature of the language of conveyancing documents develops the idea that legal
language could not tolerate someone making a simple gift by just saying or writing five 
words: ‘I give you my orange’. 
If expressed in legal language, the speaker in Symonds’ parody is presented as
needing to say or write this: 
I hereby give you all and singular, my estate and interest, right, title, claim and advantage 
of and in my orange, with all its rind, skin, juice, pulp and pips, and all right and 
advantages therein, with full power to bite, cut, suck and otherwise eat the same, or give 
the same away as fully and effectually as I am now entitled to bite, cut, suck or otherwise 
eat the same orange, or give the same way, with or without its rind, skin, juice, pulp, and 
pips, anything hereinbefore, or hereinafter, or in any other deed, or deeds, instrument or 
instruments of what nature or kind soever, to the contrary in any wise, notwithstanding. 
(Symonds 1835: 75) 
Note that this 114-word extract consists of just one sentence. Write a paraphrase,
dividing that sentence into as many shorter sentences as you need to express the
meaning. As you do this, note which expressions or ideas are difficult – or even
impossible – to restate. 
❏	 Make a list of features that are prominent in this caricature that you associate 
with legal style. The overall performative speech act is clear: ‘I (hereby) give’. 
Beyond that, you will find it difficult to categorise and restate exactly what 
is going on. 
❏	 Think first in terms of vocabulary (including length of words, mix of word 
classes such as adjectives, nouns and verbs, as well as differences between 
apparently ordinary or everyday words and terms confined to a restricted, 
legal circulation). 
❏	 Now look at word order, and choice of grammatical constructions (which 
you will see more clearly when you try to rewrite). 
❏	 What about rhetorical devices (e.g. reinforcing repetition, use of lists)? 
❏	 Now ask yourself: how does difficulty in understanding exactly what is being 
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Activity✪ 
This famous passage is discussed in many works; a useful description of its jargon 
features can be found in Butt (2013: 250–1). 
‘The sky is blue’ 
Our second parody of legal language is by Daniel R. White, who worked as a corporate 
lawyer in Washington, DC before turning to creative writing; it can be found in his 
anthology Trials and Tribulations: An Appealing Anthology of Legal Humour (1989). In 
a short essay ‘The sky is blue’, White creates a scenario in which a junior associate in 
a law firm is taken to task by a senior colleague for saying ‘The sky is blue’. 
The theme is basically the same as with ‘I give you my orange’: a simple proposition 
judged to be inadequate as a legal statement. This time, however, we will not quote 
the passage. Instead, you are presented with a paraphrase. So now you have to 
concentrate not on choice of particular words or grammatical forms, which have been 
changed, but on the effect created by more abstract rhetorical strategies: 
For a lawyer, the senior colleague explains, ‘The sky is blue’ is not an adequate proposition. 
The first qualification needed is that the sky must be described only as ‘generally’ blue, 
since it may not always be blue. Also, it can only ‘appear’ rather than categorically be that 
colour. The proposition must also be defended against possible challenges, including that 
the sky might not be blue in other parts of the world. So: particular places must be 
specified, for instance in a list. And what about the meaning of ‘sky’? ‘Sky’, the older 
colleague explains, cannot be simply assumed as something you see when you look up, 
since there may be other things you see that are not sky. In any case, the sky will only be 
visible if you are outside. So those aspects need to be incorporated into the statement, as 
well as the times at which the perception is possible (presumably during the day, since 
for instance stars, the colleague points out, are not blue). The senior partner complains 
that the proposition ‘has more holes in it than Swiss cheese’. 
❏	 Describe the main characteristics of legal discourse that White draws 
attention to in the story (at least as you have experienced it in this 
paraphrased treatment). 
❏	 What characteristics of ‘lawyerly’ thought, speech patterns and rhetorical 
moves does White emphasise? 
❏	 How separable, or interwoven, do the following aspects appear to be in this 
passage: (i) ways of using language; and (ii) the purposes for which particular 
uses of language have developed or been designed? 
❏	 The passage is clearly intended to be humorous. But are there characteristics 
attributed to legal language that you would want to defend – as being 
desirable or even essential in particular contexts of use? 
Finally, consider White’s way of ending his short essay. He appends ‘10 principles
of legal writing’, which include the following:
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never to use one word where ten will do; never to use a small word where a big one will 
suffice; never to use a simple statement where it appears that one of substantially greater 
complexity will achieve comparable goals; never to use English where Latin, mutatis 
mutandis, will do; and always to qualify virtually everything . . . 
(White 1989: 246) 
Extrapolating from features of style to overall effect, White concludes, ‘If a layperson 
can read a document from beginning to end without falling asleep, it needs work’. What 
point do you think White is making in this concluding comment, given the seriousness 
of legal language in its social effects? 
Finally, compare the two parodies of legal language we have presented. Keep in mind 
that you are engaged in a thought-priming activity here, rather than searching for 
correct answers. Fuller description of legal language varieties is presented elsewhere in 
Thread 1 and in Threads 2 and 3. 
❏	 How far do the two passages point towards similar idiosyncrasies or excesses? 
Do any major differences between the targeted characteristics stand out? 
❏	 The two passages were published over 100 years apart. Is the degree of 
similarity or difference you see between the two passages surprising? 
C2  
Activity ✪ 
REFORMING LEGAL LANGUAGE	 C2 
In this unit, we discuss claims and counterclaims that surround proposed reforms of 
legal language. We show why making changes to legal language is difficult by presenting 
a practical task based on an early English statute, and conclude with observations about 
current ‘plain language reform’ proposals. 
Legal language and its critics 
Units A2 and B2 trace the formation of legal English through complicated contact 
between French, Latin and English, and links processes of language change not only to 
political developments, but also to the formation of a community of practice – lawyers 
– who subscribe to a number of principles about their professional language use: 
❏	 standardisation and consistency of documents in the face of contextual variability; 
❏	 resilience of legal documents in the face of challenge by other lawyers involved in 
adversarial proceedings; and 
❏	 decontextualisation in document drafting, so that legal documents can be
interpreted in different situations arising in later periods (see Butt 2013 for 
discussion of drafting principles based on these linguistic norms). 
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